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The Dischargeability in Bankruptcy of
Debts For Alimony and Property
Settlements Arising From Divorce
John Francis Murphy, Esq.*
As the practices of bankruptcy law and divorce law become more
specialized, the practitioner of either discipline is less likely to be suf-
ficiently familiar with the other. When a divorced spouse files bank-
ruptcy, the expectations of either spouse may be thwarted by a
practitioner's lack of experience in the other discipline. This article
explores the area of dischargeability in bankruptcy of debts for ali-
mony, maintenance, child support, and property settlements.
Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code provides an exception to
the debtor's discharge for debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child
for alimony, maintenance, or child support; such debts are not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. However, obligations arising from a hus-
band and wife's apportionment of debts through a property
settlement agreement are dischargeable. This dichotomy generates
numerous intricacies for counsel in the realm of divorce law and
bankruptcy law.
Amended section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 is the
current bankruptcy statute which governs dischargeability of debts
for alimony and property settlements. The immediately preceding
statute was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.1 In 1903, an amendment to
the 1898 statute expressly provided in section 17a(2) that a discharge
in bankruptcy did not discharge a debt from liability "for alimony
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1. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child,
or for seduction of an unmarried female, or for criminal conversation
. . 2 In 1917, the exclusion from discharge in section 17a(2) was
broadened by the addition of an exception "for breach of promise of
marriage accompanied by seduction. ... 3 In 1970, the substance of
the alimony exception was changed to section 17a(7). 4
When the 1978 statute was passed, the alimony exception was in-
corporated at 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(5), but the material on seduc-
tion, criminal conversation, and breach of promise to marry was not
incorporated. Section 523(a)(5) then stated:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not dis-
charge an individual debtor from any debt -
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement, but not to the
extent that -
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law,
or otherwise; or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or sup-
port, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or
support .... 5
It is notable that the 1903 amendment provided an exception for lia-
bility to a "wife," while the 1978 statute renders certain debts non-
dischargeable when payable to a "spouse." Thus, husbands may find
succor in the reciprocity of the new statute.6
A 1981 amendment to section 523(a)(5) added the following high-
lighted language to subsection "A": "(A) such debt is assigned to an-
other entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise, (other
than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Se-
curity Act) . . . . "7 The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984 further augmented section 523(a)(5) with the
following highlighted language exempting debts:
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record or property set-
tlement agreement, but not to the extent that -
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law,
or otherwise, (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the
Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal
2. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798.
3. Act of Mar. 2, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-376, 39 Stat. 999.
4. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(84 Stat.) 1156, 1158.
5. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat.) 2549, 2590-91 (emphasis added) (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
6. See also Balthazor v. Winnebago County (In re Balthazor), 36 Bankr. 656
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984) (paternity obligations are not dischargeable in bankruptcy).
7. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (95 Stat.) 357, 863 (emphasis added).
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Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such State); .... 8
The addition of the language, "or other order of a court of record,"
has the effect, inter alia, of excepting from discharge obligations for
paternity to the extent the order is for maintenance or support.9
Section 523(a)(5) currently reads as follows:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not dis-
charge an individual debtor from any debt -
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record or property set-
tlement agreement, but not to the extent that -
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law,
or otherwise, (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the
Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal
Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such State); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or sup-
port, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or
support; .... 10
One court has enunciated the purpose of section 523(a)(5) as follows:
The rationale for the exemption from discharge for support obligations is
threefold: the protection of the spouse who may lack job skills or who may be
incapable of working, the protection of minor children who may be neglected
if the custodial spouse entered the job market, and the protection of society
from an increased welfare burden that may result if debtors could avoid their
familial responsibilities by filing for bankruptcy.
1 1
A debt is exempted from discharge only if four requirements are
met: (1) the debt is owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor; (2) it is for alimony, maintenance, or child support; (3) it
arises under a property settlement agreement, divorce decree, or
other order of a court of record; and (4) it can be assigned only under
section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act or assigned to an entity
other than the federal, state, or local government. 12 The determina-
tion of whether a debt is non-dischargeable as alimony, maintenance,
or support is a question of federal law.13
Under the first element, the statute provides that the beneficiary
of the provision must be a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
8. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 376 (emphasis added).
9. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 523.15 [4] (15th ed. 1981).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
11. Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Comment, Pu-
tative Spousal Support Rights and the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 25 UCLA L. REV. 96,
96-97 n.7 (1977).
12. Rankin v. Alloway (In re Alloway), 37 Bankr. 420, 424-25 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984).
13. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 904-05 (11th Cir. 1985).
debtor. Where the debtor and the nondebtor have agreed that the
debtor will be primarily liable for nondebtor spouse obligations, the
debt is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5) so long as: (1) the
payment of the obligation is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or
support; and (2) the nondebtor spouse remains secondarily liable on
the debt or would lose something of value in the absence of the
debtor's payment on the debt. This rule supports the result that
when the debtor has agreed to pay a joint obligation of both spouses,
that obligation may be nondischargeable even though the duty of
payment runs from the debtor to a third party creditor.14 As stated
by one bankruptcy court:
If the debtor has assumed an obligation of the debtor's spouse to a third party
in connection with a separation agreement, property settlement agreement, or
divorce proceeding, such debt is dischargeable to the extent that payment of
the debt by the debtor is not actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance,
or support of debtor's spouse, former spouse, or child. 1 5
Where spouses are jointly liable on a debt secured by property
which is transferred to the nondebtor spouse along with the primary
obligation to repay the debt, the debt will likely be dischargeable. 16
Conversely, if the nondebtor gets the property while the debtor has
assumed the primary duty to repay the joint debt, the debt will prob-
ably be nondischargeable.17 For instance, the bankruptcy court may
find that the debtor's agreement to be the primary obligor on a joint
mortgage is a nondischargeable obligation.1 S In such a case, both the
creditor and the nondebtor spouse have standing to bring an action
for nondischargeability. 19
The above stated rules apply to counsel fees awarded in a divorce
action. Because federal bankruptcy law, as opposed to state law, de-
termines what constitutes alimony, it has been argued that counsel
fees awarded in a divorce action are nondischargeable. 20 Although
most courts are unwilling to reach this absolute conclusion, the prac-
tical result is usually the same:
The majority rule is that, except when it appears clearly that the award was a
14. Lewis v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 39 Bankr. 842, 845 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) (third
party debt only nondischargeable if the underlying obligation was in the nature of ali-
mony, maintenance, or support); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1110
(6th Cir. 1983) (third party debt not alimony or support if amount assumed unreasona-
bly exceeds traditional notions of support).
15. Lewis, 39 Bankr. at 845.
16. Malone v. Hackworth (In re Hackworth), 27 Bankr. 638 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982) (the intent of the parties to effect a distribution of property or to provide support
may generally be indicated by the separation agreement).
17. Id.
18. Lewis, 39 Bankr. at 845.
19. Porter v. Gwinn (In re Gwinn), 20 Bankr. 233, 234-35 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)
(attorney had standing to obtain fees earned in a California marriage dissolution, since
fees were in the nature of spousal support).
20. Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1981) (Lumbard, J.,
dissenting).
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property settlement, attorney fees awarded to an ex-spouse in a divorce de-
cree are so closely connected with an award for support as to be in the nature
of support or alimony and, therefore, are nondischargeable. 2 1
Nonetheless, where the debtor is solely liable for the attorney fees,
the fees are dischargeable. 22
Reserving for later discussion the second element of section
523(a)(5), the third element simply requires that the obligation arise
under a property settlement agreement, separation agreement, di-
vorce decree, or other order of a court of record.23 The fourth ele-
ment requires the obligation to be assigned either pursuant to section
402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act or to an entity other than a fed-
eral, state, or local government. 24
Under the second element of nondischargeability, the debt must be
for alimony, maintenance or child support and the obligation must
actually be "in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support." 25
Most problems under section 523(a)(5) revolve around this second re-
quirement. The theoretical underpinning of the problem is best un-
derstood in light of two conflicting federal policies:
In determining the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(5) we must be
mindful of two competing federal policies. The first is that granting the
debtor a fresh start with his discharge of debts is a fundamental goal of bank-
ruptcy relief. The second is that the former spouse rather than society should
be responsible for maintenance and support of members of the family which is
split by divorce or separation. These two considerations must be balanced
with an eye toward the burden of proof on the dischargeability of a debt
which is placed on the party seeking such relief.2 6
The characterization of whether a debt is alimony, maintenance, or
support is determined as of the time the agreement or decree creat-
ing the obligation arose. The bankruptcy court is not required to
make continuing inquiries into changes in the financial condition of
the parties.27 Nonetheless, when a federal court determines the na-
21. Stanzione and Stanzione, P.A. v. Shenewolf (In re Shenewolf), 27 Bankr. 187,
188 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982) (quoting Glover v. Glover (In re Glover), 16 Bankr. 213, 215
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981)).
22. See Eisen v. Linn (In re Linn), 38 Bankr. 762, 763 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. III 1985).
24. Id. § 523(a)(5)(A).
25. Id. § 523(a)(5)(B). See also supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
26. Rankin v. Alloway (In re Alloway), 37 Bankr. 420, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)
(citations omitted). See also Shaver v. Shaver (In re Shaver), 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.
1984). In Shaver, the court stated that section 523(a)(5) "departs from the general pol-
icy of absolution, or 'fresh start', [sic] that is embodied in the federal Bankruptcy Act.
It enforces an overriding public policy favoring the enforcement of familial obliga-
tions." Id. at 1315-16 (footnote omitted).
27. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir. 1985); contra
Warner v. Warner (In re Warner), 5 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
ture of an obligation imposed by a divorce decree, it must consider
subsequent alterations in the decree made by the state court.28
A number of courts suggest that the sole consideration for deter-
mining whether an obligation is alimony, maintenance, or support is
the intent of the parties.29 As one court stated, "[T]he crucial ques-
tion is what function did the parties intend the agreement to serve
when they entered into it."30
Other courts believe that the intent of the parties is but one consid-
eration, albeit a major one.31 Although usually unstated, these courts
seem to be basing their decisions on the parties' intent as well as each
court's perception of whether the debt is in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support.32 Sufficient theoretical support for this po-
sition stems from the language of the statute, plus the presence of
the competing federal policies of a fresh start in bankruptcy versus
the need to support one's family.
Although in theory the two approaches differ, the distinctions blur
in practical application. The statutory language provides sufficient
latitude for each court to decide whether a particular marital debt is
dischargeable.
Under either approach the issue of the parties' intent is a question
of fact to be decided by a trial court, sitting without a jury, in light of
all the facts and circumstances. This intent becomes fixed at the
time the obligation is incurred and is not affected by subsequent
events, barring the divorce court's increase or decrease in an award.33
A determination of intent is particularly difficult since the designa-
tions used by the parties or the divorce court in establishing whether
a debt is alimony or part of a property settlement are not conclusive,
although due consideration for those labels is afforded by the bank-
ruptcy court.34
The problem is further compounded because at the time alimony is
awarded and the property divided, the parties often do not intend to
differentiate between an alimony debt and a property settlement ob-
ligation, but rather view both merely as financial obligations arising
from the separation or divorce. Without some awareness of the legal
consequences of their choice, the parties would have no purpose or
rationale in making such a distinction. Since the parties typically do
28. Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1317 n.5.
29. Melichar v. Ost (In re Melichar), 661 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 927 (1982).
30. Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984).
31. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983) (intent is
the threshold factor).
32. Id.
33. Williams v. Williams (In re Williams), 703 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (8th Cir. 1983).
34. See id. at 1057. See also Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1982).
(Vol. 14: 69, 1986] Dischargeability in Bankruptcy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
not intend to distinguish the debts, a court usually must establish
their constructive intent from the facts and circumstances of the
case.
The amorphous state of the law in this area appears to result from
an almost inevitable intermixing of fact and law in the adjudication
process. A court resolving the issue finds the facts and applies the
law without the aid of a jury.35
The factors - listed in order of this author's view of importance -
for determining whether a debt is in the nature of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support, rather than a property settlement, are as follows:
1. Whether the parties stated in the document creating the
debt that, within the meaning of section 523(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the obligation in question was or was not
intended to be support, alimony, or maintenance.3 6
2. Whether the creditor-spouse relinquished support or
maintenance in exchange for the obligation at issue.3 7
3. Whether the obligation ceases or diminishes on the oc-
curence of certain conditions, such as the remarriage or
death of the spouse, or the attainment of majority age for a
child.38
4. Whether the obligation is for a sum certain payable in
fixed installments or whether the amount due is "open
ended."39
5. The parties' treatment of the obligation under the tax
laws, particularly if such intention is expressed in the docu-
ment or order creating the obligation.40
6. The relative financial condition of the parties and their
respective earning capacity:4 1
35. Questions on dischargeability are "core" matters within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) (Supp. III 1985). As such they fall within the equity jurisdiction
of the Bankruptcy Court. The parties have no right to a jury trial on issues in equity.
Billebault v. Schmid (In re Schmid), 54 Bankr. 520, 520-23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
36. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
37. See Tunny v. Ploski (In re Ploski), 44 Bankr. 911, 914 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984);
Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 21 Bankr. 335, 338 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
See also Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1108 (6th Cir. 1983).
38. Shaver v. Shaver (In re Shaver), 27 Bankr. 452, 453-54 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1983),
aff'd, 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Williams (In re Williams), 38 Bankr.
224, 226 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1984); Rankin v. Alloway (In re Alloway), 37 Bankr. 420,
425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
39. Basile v. Basile (In re Basile), 44 Bankr. 221, 223 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984).
40. Coffman v. Coffman (In re Coffman), 52 Bankr. 667, 675 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985).
41. As one court has stated, "If an agreement fails to provide explicitly for spousal
support, a court may presume that a so-called 'property settlement' is intended for sup-
a. The age, health, work skills, and educational levels
of the parties;42
b. Whether the payment was fashioned in order to bal-
ance the disparate income of the parties;43
c. The financial resources of each spouse, including in-
come from employment or elsewhere;44
d. Whether there was a need for support at the time of
the decree, and whether the support award would have
been inadequate absent the obligation in question; 45
e. Whether there are minor children in the custody of
the creditor spouse;46
f. The standard of living of the parties during their
marriage;47
7. The duration of the marriage;48
8. And finally, of dubious validity, the circumstances con-
tributing to the estrangement of the parties.4 9
Applying these factors, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit cogently stated:
Fairly divergent dispositions have resulted from utilization of the above fac-
tors. The initial difficulty is that every assumption of a joint loan obligation in
a divorce settlement at least indirectly contributes to support. The former
spouse is relieved of payments on that debt and thus has funds for other pur-
poses including necessary support. Support in this broad sense results even if
the assumption of joint marital debts is actually a division of property. 5 0
On a related front, even where state law does not provide for ali-
mony, maintenance, or support, the bankruptcy court may find that
an obligation is in the nature of those benefits within the meaning of
the Bankruptcy Code.5 1 Payment of child support beyond the age es-
tablished by the state law definition of minority does not preclude an
port when the circumstances of the case indicate that the recipient spouse needs sup-
port." Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1316.
42. Tsanos v. Bell (In re Bell), 47 Bankr. 284, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); Pody v.
Pody (In re Pody), 42 Bankr. 570, 573 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984); Anderson v. Anderson
(In re Anderson), 21 Bankr. 335, 338 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
43. Wesley v. Wesley (In re Wesley), 36 Bankr. 526, 529 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
44. Holland v. Holland (In re Holland), 48 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1984); Warner v. Warner (In re Warner), 5 Bankr. 434, 442 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
45. See, e.g., Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983)
(where debt assumed for automobile needed for transportation to work was in the na-
ture of support).
46. Shaver, 27 Bankr. at 454.
47. Coffman v. Coffman (In re Coffman), 52 Bankr. 667, 675 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985).
48. Mencer v. Mencer (In re Mencer), 50 Bankr. 80, 83 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985)
(marriage of sixteen years helped establish that payments were intended as support);
Altavilla v. Altavilla (In re Altavilla), 40 Bankr. 938, 941 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (mar-
riage of twenty years).
49. Seablom v. Seablom (In re Seablom), 45 Bankr. 445, 450-52 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1984); Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980).
50. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1108 (6th Cir. 1983).
51. See, e.g., Shaver v. Shaver (In re Shaver), 736 F.2d 1314, 1315 (9th Cir. 1984)
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exception to discharge of that portion of an obligation.5 2
Finally, a few other pertinent factors should be considered: one
portion of an award may be dischargeable while another portion may
not;53 and the interest on nondischargeable debts is not dischargea-
ble.54 Also, establishing specific dollar amounts for domestic obliga-
tions is not an appropriate task for a federal court; that duty is
appropriately left to state courts.55
The Filing of Suit to Determine the Dischargeability of a Debt
Under Section 523(a)(5)
For debts falling within sections 523(a)(2), (4), and (6), a creditor
must file a timely complaint in the bankruptcy court to determine
nondischargeability. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bank-
ruptcy Rules provide for such a limitation in determining the non-
dischargeability of a debt under section 523(a)(5) or other provisions
of section 523(a). Thus, there is no express limitation on the time for
bringing an action under section 523(a)(5). It may be filed while the
bankruptcy is pending or after the case has been closed. Further-
more, at least after the bankruptcy has been closed, a suit for a decla-
ration of nondischargeability may be brought in the bankruptcy
court, in state court, or in federal district court, so long as the respec-
tive courts have jurisdiction under the facts of the case. 56 Arguably,
in the absence of relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. sec-
tion 362(d),57 a creditor's filing of suit in state or federal district court
while the bankruptcy case is pending would be automatically stayed
under 11 U.S.C. section 362(a). 58
The Burden of Proof Under Section 523(a)(5)
Bankruptcy Rule 4005 provides that "on a complaint objecting to a
discharge, the plaintiff has the burden of proving his objection."59
(where decree awarded wife $1500 per month child support and $2000 per month for
"property rights" to last for 75 months, unless wife died earlier).
52. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1985).
53. Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980).
54. Frederickson v. Coleman (In re Coleman), 56 Bankr. 179, 180 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1986).
55. Harrell, 754 F.2d at 907 n.9.
56. Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1983) (decided under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
58. Id. § 362(a).
59. R. BANKR. P. 4005 (West 1984). Bankruptcy Rule 4005.
While this rule addresses an "objection," rather than an "exception,"
to discharge under 11 U.S.C. section 727, some courts have construed
it as meaning that under section 523(a) the burden of proof is on the
party requesting an exception. 60 Independently of Bankruptcy Rule
4005, some courts have fashioned the principle that when an excep-
tion to discharge under section 523(a) is asserted, the burden of proof
is on the creditor.61 Under section 523(a)(5), many courts have
placed the burden of proof on the creditor spouse. 62 This application
of the burden of proof poses theoretical problems.
The difficulty stems from the fact that the burden of proof is prop-
erly placed on the creditor in cases involving the 523(a)(2), (4), or (6)
exceptions to discharge, for the simple reason that granting a dis-
charge supports the federal policy that an honest debtor in bank-
ruptcy should receive a "fresh start," and should be exonerated from
his pre-existing debts. Nevertheless, the "fresh start" principle is at
odds with the federal principle embraced by section 523(a)(5) that a
former spouse, rather than society, should be responsible for mainte-
nance and support of members of a family which is split by divorce or
separation.6 3
This commentator suggests that under section 523(a)(5) the burden
of proof is not squarely on the creditor spouse, as many courts have
stated, but is in fact almost evenly balanced between the parties.
Some courts have gone so far as to say that the burden of proof under
section 523(a)(5) weighs in favor of the creditor spouse in certain
instances. 64
The Standard of Review on Appeal
Regarding the standard of review on appeal of a determination
made under section 523(a)(5), one court has stated: "[T]he crucial
question is what function did the parties intend the agreement to
serve when they entered into it. This is a question of fact for the
bankruptcy court to decide, and the appellate courts can set aside the
bankruptcy court's finding only if clearly erroneous." 65 This is
60. See, e.g., National Bonding and Accident Ins. Co. v. Peterson (In re Peterson),
51 Bankr. 486 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985). A successful objection to discharge results in a
complete denial of discharge; none of the debtor's debts are discharged. A successful
exception to discharge does not prohibit the debtor from obtaining a discharge, but the
discharge will not be effective against the creditor prevailing on the exception to
discharge.
61. See, e.g., Kleppinger v. Kleppinger (In re Kleppinger), 27 Bankr. 530, 531
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982).
62. Rankin v. Alloway (In re Alloway), 37 Bankr. 420, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 425-26.
65. Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). See also
In re Coil, 680 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1982) ("clearly erroneous standard" is the
proper standard of review).
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clearly the proper scope of review if the issue for resolution in the
bankruptcy court is the intent of the parties.66
As stated above, some courts have adjudicated the issue of dis-
chargeability under section 523(a)(5) on the assumption that the in-
tent of the parties is not the sole question for resolution in the trial
court. These trial courts based their decisions on the intent of the
parties plus certain concerns of public policy. If these courts are cor-
rect,67 the "abuse of discretion" standard is proper, rather than the
"clearly erroneous" standard.68
Suggestions For Practitioners
When representing a party in a divorce or similar action, review
the document or proposed court order establishing alimony, mainte-
nance, support, or a property settlement, and determine if the parties
expressly state whether each obligation is "intended as alimony,
maintenance, or support within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. section
523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code."
Thus, a settlement agreement, divorce decree or similar document
could provide, inter alia, that:
The obligations specified in sections 1, 3, 5, 10, and 11 of this document are
intended by the parties as alimony, maintenance or support within the mean-
ing of 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Contrarywise, the obligations specified in sections 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12 of
this document are not intended by the parties as alimony, maintenance, or
support within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
CONCLUSION
Whether an agreement or court order, in a particular case, appor-
tioning debt between spouses or former spouses will be construed by
a court as creating a dischargeable debt, does not appear highly pre-
dictable. The exceptions to this perceived rule appear to be instances
where the parties to an agreement or court order consciously evalu-
ate the possible issue of bankruptcy and express in the agreement or
order their intent as to whether the obligation is a property settle-
66. Cf Shaver v. Shaver (In re Shaver), 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[I]f an
agreement fails to provide explicitly for spousal support, a court may presume that a
so-called 'property settlement' is intended for support when the circumstances of the
case indicate that the recipient spouse needs support.").
67. See, e.g., id. ("gross abuse of discretion" required for reversal on appeal).
68. See, e.g., Troup v. Troup (In re Troup), 730 F.2d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 1984) (clearly
erroneous standard applied).
ment, or whether, in fact, it is intended as alimony maintenance, or
support.
